EDITORIAL - Systemic sloth in local dispute resolution

“To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice.” –Magna Carta (40)

The decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) on appeal from Barbados last Friday would have been regarded as newsworthy, principally for the determination by our highest court of what constitutes a single man for the purposes of a relationship of cohabitation for the stipulated period, so as to permit the female partner to such a relationship to claim the status of “spouse” under the Succession Act 1979.

Less noteworthy perhaps, but nonetheless equally significant, was the fact the judgment of the CCJ once again adverted to the regrettable lack of expedition demonstrated by the local court system in the resolution of legal disputes. This has by now become a lament of our highest appellate court. In Sea Havens Inc. v John Dyrud (2011), the Court observed –

We note that the times taken by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal to produce their written judgments have been shorter than in some previous cases heard by us but are still too long, respectively 14 February 2007 (order made) to 21 May 2008 (written reasons) and 8 October 2008 (appellate hearing) to 27 May 2010 (appellate judgment). As exhorted by Saunders JCCJ in Yolande Reid v Jerome Leon Reid judges should strive to deliver judgments within three months normally or in complex cases within six months, though it is appreciated that an unfortunate backlog of judgments waiting to be drafted may delay matters for some time.

In that case, there was a delay of four years eight months from 6 June 2002 to 7 February 2007 before the Appellant’s case was heard. This was blamed entirely on “the civil justice system”. The CCJ was not pleased. In its view, “this [was] a most unsatisfactory situation that needs to be remedied…and further “the expeditious resolution of commercial disputes yields a net benefit not just to the litigants but also to the economy of Barbados. It is very important that specific performance cases such as this be identified early as needing timely disposition…”

In the most recent matter, the proceedings began in April 2008 and the preliminary point of law as to whether Ms Smith was a spouse within the Act and thereby entitled to a grant of administration. The decision was delivered two years later but the appeal was not heard until more than five years subsequently. The Court of Appeal’s decision was given just over one year later. The CCJ was critical of this effluxion of timen-

“The question whether to proceed with the application for administration pending the hearing of the interlocutory appeal should have been considered, at that time, to give effect to the overriding objective to obtain a just resolution expeditiously.

While this may be taken more as a censure of the failure of counsel to act expeditiously, the system itself was similarly chastised-”We also say, with the intention to promote reform, that a more expeditious appeal process would have mitigated the distress suffered by the litigants”.

Our system for the delivery of justice should be suitably chastened by these observations. Whether we institute a system of court ordered mediation, whether there is a reform of the registries, or the recognition of the need for expedition by counsel or the enforcement of a strict requirement for judges to deliver judgments in a stipulated period after hearing, we can no longer afford to delay justice to litigants.