EDITORIAL
In its passage last week of the Bill to amend the Offences Against the Person Act, Cap. 141, to make provision for the repeal of the mandatory imposition of the penalty of death for the offence of murder, the Lower House of Parliament would have at once managed to achieve at least three demands placed on the state by various interests.
First, it served to effect compliance with the order of the Inter-American Court off Human Rights in Case of Boyce et al v Barbados in November 2007 that “the State shall adopt, within a reasonable time from the date of notification of the present Judgement, such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty does not contravene the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, and in particular, that it is not imposed through mandatory sentencing…”
Second, it would have appeased somewhat the local anti-hanging lobby that views the imposition of the death penalty as discriminatory, non-deterrent in
effect, and both cruel and inhuman and thus unconstitutional punishment.
Third, the local pro-hanging lobby would be comforted by the provision in the Bill that the death penalty will yet be retained for a lengthy number of types of murders, including those that were committed with a high level of brutality, cruelty, depravity, or callousness; where the murder involved calculated or lengthy planning; where the victim of the murder was employed in a specified office, and the office of the deceased was a factor in the commission of the offence; where the deceased was a member of the Police, Defence Force, the Special Constabulary or was employed as a prison officer, and the office of the deceased was a factor in the commission of the offence; the “hate murder” provision in (e) where the deceased was a member of a group of persons who have a common characteristic such as race, nationality, ethnicity or religion, and this was a factor in the commission of the offence; where the deceased was a witness or a juror in a pending or concluded trial and this was a factor in the commission of the offence; the deceased was particularly vulnerable because of his age, health or disability or because of any other factor; where the person convicted was convicted of two or more offences of murder, whether or not arising from the same circumstances; or, where, in the opinion of the Court, there are any other exceptional circumstances which must be taken into account and which justify the imposition of a sentence of death.
The breadth of these provisions and the omnibus nature of the final category will entail, in our view, that there may indeed be little change to the current incidence of the imposition of the death penalty. What we have now effected, seemingly, is to categorise the commission of murder into degrees, whereby a murder in the first degree, as in the circumstances stipulated above, may render the accused liable to suffer the penalty of death, while that in the second degree or in the residual category will not render the accused so liable unless the court is of the view that such a sentence is justified in the circumstances.
Finally, the Bill also makes remedial provision for those who, prior to the coming into effect of the amendment, was mandatorily sentenced to death. In this regard, the Chief Justice is mandated to set aside this sentence and to impose a new sentence in accordance with the amended provisions.
We endorse the amendment.